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POLICY ACT OF 1984
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) began
regulating broadcast industry employment practices in 1968, when it an-
nounced that operating licenses would no longer be granted to stations prac-
ticing deliberate employment discrimination.' Although there was no
express statutory basis for this action, the Commission relied on the broad
mandate of the Communications Act of 1934,2 empowering the FCC to pro-
tect the public interest, and the wide discretion the courts had afforded to
the FCC to pursue that statutory mandate. 3 The Department of Justice sup-
ported the FCC's assertion of authority, contending that expanded minority
employment in the broadcast industry could provide a forceful impetus for
social change because of the broadcast media's "enormous impact" on
American life.4
In the years that have followed, the FCC has required broadcasters to
submit annual employment forms and has used "processing guidelines" to
evaluate the affirmative action efforts of licensees. Under these guidelines,
1. In re Petition for Rulemaking To Require Broadcast Licensees To Show Nondiscrimi-
nation in Their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 771 (1968).
2. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
609 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)). The Act authorizes the FCC to regulate "communication by wire
and radio so as to make available . . . to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service .... " 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1982). Under provisions of the Act, broadcast licenses may be granted, continued, and re-
newed only after a determination of "public convenience, interest, or necessity." 47 U.S.C.
§§ 307, 309(a) (1982).
3. See FCC v. RCA Communications Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90, 98 (1953) (although the FCC
may take market factors into consideration, it is free to ignore the policies favoring competi-
tion underlying the federal antitrust laws if to do so would be in the public interest, conven-
ience and necessity); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940)
(Communications Act of 1934 leaves to the FCC the determination of questions of procedure
in ascertaining the public interest, including the scope of inquiry and other questions).
4. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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broadcast stations with five to ten employees are expected to employ women
and minorities at an overall rate of at least fifty percent of work force availa-
bility, but need reach only twenty-five percent of that level among upper
level workers.5 Stations with more than ten workers are expected to achieve
a fifty percent work force parity among management-level employees.6 The
guidelines have been defended by the FCC on several occasions and have
been cited in federal court decisions by judges who, while noting the exis-
tence of the FCC's equal employment opportunity rules, have not addressed
directly the merits of using the processing guidelines.7
The FCC began overseeing cable industry employment practices in 1972.8
Regulation was premised on the notions that multichannel capacity pro-
vided great potential for minority-sensitive programming and that operators
unwilling to provide equal opportunity employment would be less responsive
to special interest needs.9 Twelve years later, the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 19841° (Cable Act) established guidelines for regulating the
cable industry and amended the Communications Act of 1934 to provide an
express statutory authority for the Commission's affirmative action efforts
with respect to cable companies.
Ironically, while the 1984 Cable Act provided express statutory authority
for the Commission's affirmative action policy, it has revived debate over the
constitutionality of the FCC's equal employment rules and enforcement ef-
forts. The Cable Act contains a broad requirement for an annual certifica-
tion process and periodic inspections," but leaves the FCC substantial
discretion to determine the contours of cable industry equal employment
opportunity (EEO) regulation. The legislative history of the Cable Act
shows, however, that Congress purposely deleted a section of the proposed
bill that would have allowed the FCC to employ processing guidelines to the
cable industry modeled after those applied to the broadcast industry.' 2 For
that reason, it is not surprising that the most controversial aspect of the
5. FCC Public Notice No. 1364 (Dec. 15, 1983).
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 57-59, 62-64, 225, 232-35 and accompanying text.
8. Report and Order, In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Require Opera-
tors of Community Antenna Television Systems and Community Antenna Relay Station
Licensees To Show Nondiscrimination in their Employment Practices, 34 F.C.C.2d 186
(1972).
9. Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611)
[hereinafter cited as Cable Act]. When referring to the Cable Communications Policy Act,
this Comment shall refer to pertinent sections of the United States Code under its Cable Com-
munications Policy Act rubrics.
11. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
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FCC's proposed affirmative action regulations for cable operators13 was the
agency's plan to use "existing processing guidelines"' 4 to analyze hiring and
promotional practices by race, ethnicity, and sex. Despite objections, the
FCC's final regulations included an equal employment compliance monitor-
ing plan that employs numerical quotas. The Department of Justice has de-
nounced FCC regulations as "race-conscious" and claimed that they exceed
the FCC's authority under the 1984 Cable Act and violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the Constitution.15
This Comment will discuss the FCC's authority to issue these regulations
in view of the legislative history of the 1984 Cable Act. The statutory au-
thority of the Commission to impose the controversial regulations will be
examined. This Comment also will examine the constitutionality of the
FCC's cable EEO regulations in view of the Supreme Court's recent affirma-
tive action decisions. The analysis will discuss the tenuous constitutional
grounds upon which the affirmative action requirements imposed on broad-
casters rest and the efforts to place minority ownership preferences on firmer
tooting. Finally, it will examine the practical problems inherent in efforts to
impose affirmative action requirements on cable entities. The Comment will
conclude that the FCC's regulation of the employment practices of cable
operators is beyond the scope of the Cable Act and violates the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FCC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY
A. FCC Regulation of Employment Practices: The Programming Nexus
FCC programming scrutiny began after viewers of WLBT-TV in Jackson,
Mississippi, accused the station of refusing to present viewpoints other than
those held by segregationists, thus denying any exposure to integrationist
perspectives.1 6 The first complaint, filed in 1955 by the NAACP, claimed
that WLBT-TV deliberately cut off a network program about race relation-
13. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's
Rules To Implement the Equal Employment Opportunity Provisions of the Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984, MM Docket No. 85-61 (March 1, 1985). 50 Fed. Reg. 11,191
(1985).
14. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
15. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, Department of Justice, to the Federal Communications Commission (May 17, 1985).
16. See Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962); Lamar
Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143, 1146-48, 1150 (1965) (Petitioners alleged that Lamar
Life violated the Fairness Doctrine by broadcasting editorials opposing integration of the Uni-
versity of Mississippi and spot advertisements sponsored by the Jackson White Citizens Coun-
cil while refusing to allow opposing voices to be heard. WLBT-TV responded that it refused to
give exposure to the integration issue in order to avoid inflammatory reaction.).
1986]
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ships-on which NAACP General Counsel Thurgood Marshall appeared-
by flashing on viewers' screens a sign reading: "Sorry, Cable Trouble."
17
Two years later, civil rights activists filed another complaint after WLBT
broadcast a program urging the maintenance of racial segregation and then
refused requests for time to present opposing viewpoints. 18 In the years that
followed, numerous complaints were filed alleging that WLBT was violating
FCC programming requirements by failing to provide for the needs of mi-
nority citizens, who comprised nearly forty-five percent of the service area
population. 9 Violent reaction to integration efforts at the University of Mis-
sissippi during the fall of 1962 prompted the FCC to investigate the pro-
gramming policies of several Mississippi broadcasters, including WLBT.2 °
In the midst of that inquiry, petitioners, including the Office of Communica-
tion of the United Church of Christ filed the first license renewal challenge
based on discrimination, charging that WLBT-TV's programming was ra-
cially prejudiced. 2' Despite the statutory requirement mandating a license
renewal hearing when "a substantial and material question of fact" is
raised,22 the Commission-after acknowledging the seriousness of the
charges-renewed WLBT's license without a hearing.23 It based that deci-
sion, in part, on a finding that the petitioners lacked standing because they
would not suffer economic injury as a result of renewal of WLBT's license.24
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing after finding that all listen-
ers claiming specific injury had standing to file petitions to deny a license.25
The circuit court also found that "a history of programming misconduct of
the kind alleged would preclude, as a matter of law, the required finding that
17. Lamar, 38 F.C.C. at 1146-48.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1146-53. For an explanation of the FCC's programming requirements during
this period, see Report and Statement of Policy, Commission en banc Programming Inquiry,
44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314 (1960) (requiring a licensee to "make a positive, diligent and continuing
effort, in good faith, to determine the tastes, needs and desires of the public in his community
and to provide programming to meet those needs and interests"); see also National Broadcast-
ing Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding FCC regulations providing that no
license would be granted to stations with network contracts preventing them from developing
programs to serve the needs of the local community).
20. See Lamar, 38 F.C.C. at 1144.
21. Id. at 1148.
22. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
23. Lamar, 38 F.C.C. at 1153-54. The Commission limited the renewal to one year, how-
ever, rather than the customary three, and imposed conditions requiring that the licensee meet
with local civil rights leaders and stop discriminatory programming. Id.
24. Id. at 1153 n.14, 1155.
25. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 998,
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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renewal of the license would serve the public interest."'2 6 On remand, the
Commission granted a three-year renewal of WLBT-TV's license, after con-
cluding that the station had served adequately the public interest.27 Upon
reargument, the District of Columbia Circuit, declaring that "the adminis-
trative conduct reflected in [the] record [of the WLBT-TV renewal hearings]
is beyond repair," declined to remand the case again and instead ordered the
agency to revoke WLBT's license.28 The significance of the circuit court's
holding lies not only in its holding that audience members have standing to
challenge renewals, but also in its conclusion that license revocation is ap-
propriate if all major groups comprising the listening or viewing audience
are not served.
It was against this backdrop of action against discrimination in program-
ming that civil rights activists urged FCC scrutiny of broadcast employment
practices. The concerns of civil rights activists were corroborated by the
widely read Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,29
which contended that a predominately white media staff would be unable to
ascertain minority audience programming needs.3" Additionally, the De-
partment of Justice advocated FCC regulation of broadcast employment
practices." The FCC, however, declined to declare employment discrimina-
26. Id. at 1007.
27. In re Application of Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 431, 437-38 (1968).
On remand, the FCC, adopting the decision of a hearing examiner, shifted the burden of proof
to the petitioner, which was asked to prove WLBT-TV had not served the minority viewing
audience. Id. at 432-33. It also allowed the licensee to focus on programming developed after
the challenged renewal period. Id. at 432. See also In re Applications of Rust Communica-
tions Group, Inc., 73 F.C.C.2d 39, 42 (1979) (FCC stated it would no longer permit a licen-
see's post-term employment upgrade to mitigate a seriously deficient license-term EEO
record.).
28. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 550
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (Upon reargument before the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, the court held that licensees bear the burden of demonstrating operation
in the public interest.).
29. KERNER COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS (1986) [hereinafter cited as KERNER REPORT].
30. The FCC noted the Kerner Report finding that
[The media] . . . have not communicated to the majority of their audience-which is
white-a sense of the degradation, misery, and hopelessness of living in the ghetto.
They have not communicated to whites a feeling for the difficulties and frustrations
of being a Negro in the United States. They have not shown understanding or appre-
ciation of-and thus have not communicated-a sense of Negro culture, thought or
history.
13 F.C.C.2d at 774 (quoting KERNER REPORT, supra note 29, at 210).
31. In a letter to the FCC, the Department of Justice stated:
Because of the enormous impact which television and radio have upon American
life, the employment practices of the broadcasting industry have an importance
greater than that suggested by the number of its employees. The provision of equal
1986]
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tion a widespread problem within the broadcast industry.
32
The pressures applied by civil rights activists, however, prompted the
FCC to issue its 1968 statement on nondiscrimination,1 3 in which the Com-
mission proposed to proceed on a complaint basis, limiting its review to de-
termining if a licensee had violated a state or federal employment law, rather
than adopting the nondiscrimination rule urged by the United Church of
Christ.34 Nevertheless, it did undertake a rulemaking process to examine
the issue further.3 5 Several parties filed comments contending that the FCC
did not have regulatory power over employment practices because Congress
had delegated that responsibility to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.36
One year later, the FCC adopted rules prohibiting discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. 37  The
opportunity in employment in that industry could therefore contribute significantly
toward reducing and ending discrimination in other industries. For these reasons I
consider adoption of the proposed rule, or one embodying the same principles, a
positive step which your Commission appears to have ample authority to take.
Letter from Stephen J. Pollak, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division to Rosel H.
Hyde, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (May 21, 1968), reprinted in Memo-
randum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Petition for Rulemak-
ing To Require Broadcast Licensees To Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment
Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 767, 775-77 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Rulemaking].
32. 1968 Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.2d at 775.
33. Id. at 766. The 1968 statement responded to a petition filed by the Office of Commu-
nications, the Board of Homeland Ministries and the Committee for Racial Justice Now of the
United Church of Christ seeking FCC promulgation of the following rule:
No license shall be granted to any station which engages in discrimination in employ-
ment practices on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. Evidence of
compliance with this section shall be furnished with each application for a license
and annually during the term of each license upon prescribed forms.
Id. (quoting the petition filed by Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ).
34. Id. at 768, 772.
35. The Commission sought comment on whether licensees should be required to make a
showing of compliance with nondiscrimination policy and whether they should be required to
post equal employment opportunity notices. Id. at 773.
36. See Report and Order, In re Petition for Rulemaking To Require Broadcast Licensees
To Show Nondiscrimination in their Employment Practices, 18 F.C.C.2d 240, 240-41 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1969 Report and Order].
37. Id. Although the FCC's initial statements concentrated on provision of equal employ-
ment opportunities for blacks, its first regulations were designed to require scrutiny of employ-
ment of blacks, orientals, American Indians and those with spanish surnames. Id. at 243.
Later, the Commission expanded its rules to prohibit discrimination against women. Report
and Order, In re Petition for Rulemaking To Require Broadcast Licensees To Show Nondis-
crimination in Their Employment Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d 430, 431 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
1970 Report and Order]. Two years later, it began requiring that licensees submit statistical
data for women employees. Report and Order, In re Amendment of Part VI of FCC Forms
and Adding the Equal Employment Program Filing Requirements to Commission Rules, 32
F.C.C.2d 708, 709 (1971) (requiring that EEO programs filed by renewal, transfer, and con-
[Vol. 35:807
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Commission asserted that the Communications Act provided clear authority
for the action a" and that monitoring of the broadcast industry by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) would insulate too many
stations from examination. 9 Compliance standards remained vague, how-
ever, especially in light of the Commission's statement "that a licensee need
not prepare an equal employment opportunity program where the particular
minority groups concerned are represented in the area in such insignificant
numbers that a program would not be meaningful."4
The following year, the Commission adopted rules requiring most appli-
cants and licensees to file annual employment reports and written EEO pro-
grams.4 It also announced that the agency would use statistics to monitor
EEO compliance.4 2 The FCC acknowledged low turnover rates at small sta-
tions, however, and said it expected the depth and detail of EEO programs
"to vary not only with the racial makeup of the community and area, but
also with the size of the station."43 Both the National Association of Broad-
casters (NAB) and the American Broadcasting Company sought clarifica-
tion of the terms "area" and "insignificant number of minority members"
used in the Commission's rules, but the Commission declined, stating:
"Since the licensee has the continuing responsibility to know and serve the
struction permit applicants include details on the employment of women). Currently, licensees
use the following racial and ethnic reporting categories: American Indians and Alaska Na-
tives, Asians and Pacific Islanders, blacks, Hispanics, and whites. See First Report and Order,
In re Amendments of Broadcast Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and FCC Form 395,
70 F.C.C.2d 1466, 1479 (1979).
38. 1969 Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.2d at 241 (citing NBC v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943) (regulatory powers of the FCC not limited to the engineering and technical aspects
of communications, but also include the power to regulate the business practices of broadcast
stations and networks)). FCC obligations in this area might even stretch beyond the mandate
of the Communications Act, the agency said, noting: "a substantial case has been made that
because of the relationship of the Government of the United States to broadcast stations, the
Commission has a constitutional duty to assure equal employment opportunity." Id. at 241
(citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state lease of public prop-
erty must comply with the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment as though they were
binding covenants written into the agreement itself)).
39. 1969 Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.2d at 241. At the time, title VII was applicable only
to employment units with 25 or more workers. Thus, EEOC jurisdiction would have extended
to approximately 80% of all television stations but only to approximately 10% of all radio
stations. 1968 Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.2d at 767-68.
40. 1969 Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.2d at 244 n.13.
41. 1970 Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d at 430. The rule applied to employers with five
or more full-time workers. Id. at 436.
42. Id. at 431-32. The Commission said statistical data for any given year may not neces-
sarily demonstrate the existence of discriminatory employment practices at a particular sta-
tion. Such data would be used, however, "to show industry employment patterns and to raise
appropriate questions as to the causes of such patterns." Id. at 430.
43. Id. at 433.
1986]
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tastes, needs and desires of his community and area, the licensee is in the
best position to know the minority population in his service area and to re-
spond accordingly."" Therefore, the Commission concluded, it was not ap-
propriate for the FCC to provide the requested definitions.45
Until 1972, the FCC monitored compliance with its EEO rules on a case-
by-case basis, and typically determined that a poor statistical showing rela-
tive to work force availability was insufficient to require the evidentiary hear-
ing sought by petitioners to deny license renewals. 46 Then, in 1972, the FCC
formulated processing guidelines to be used in compliance reviews that ex-
amined renewal applications to determine if remedial measures were neces-
sary to increase staff representation of women and minorities. 47 The 1972
44. Id. at 434. In 1973, the FCC decided that Standard Metropolitan Statistical Measure
(SMSA) labor force statistics would demonstrate labor pool availability better than similar
data for the city of licensee. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Letter to Rev. Everett C.
Parker, Director, Office of Communication, United Church of Christ, 44 F.C.C.2d 647, 652
(1973). Subsequently, the Commission stated that a licensee utilizing an area other than
SMSA must provide substantial justification for that decision. Memorandum Opinion and
Order, In re Application of Radio Station WPFB, Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 459, 462 (1977). The
SMSA is a geographic area that consists of a central city, the county in which it is located, and
contiguous counties with a high degree of economic and social integration with the central
city. See Amendment To Implement the Equal Employment Opportunity Provisions, 50 Fed.
Reg. 40,836, 40,842 n.27 (1985) (citing Office of Management and Budget, Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas 1983). Beginning in 1983, the Office of Management and Budget changed the
reporting unit designation from SMSA to MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area). The two areas
are equivalent. See id.
45. 1970 Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d at 434.
46. See, e.g., Time-Life Broadcast, Inc. 33 F.C.C.2d 1050, 1058-59 (1972) (FCC found
statistics indicating a staff including only 2.5% Mexican employees in San Diego, where 18%
of the population was Hispanic, was insufficient to show noncompliance, after concluding,
"[tihe best evidence of... discrimination or noncompliance would be specific examples of
persons who were discriminated against by the licensee .. "); In re Application of Universal
Communications Corp., 27 F.C.C.2d 1022, 1028 (1971) (FCC found data indicating staff was
only 13% black despite the large minority population in Mobile, Alabama, insufficient evi-
dence to require a hearing, explaining, "[tihe Commission does not require employment of
minority members in direct proportion to that minority group's proportional strength in the
community . . . but does require that licensees make every effort to eliminate racial considera-
tions from influencing hiring and promotional practices."); Memorandum Opinion and Order,
In re Application of WTAR Radio-TV Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 812, 833 (Rev. Bd. 1970) ("Simply
indicating the number of blacks employed by the licensee, without citing particular instances
of discrimination or describing a conscious policy of exclusion, is not sufficient to require an
evidentiary exploration.").
47. See In re Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi,
1973, 42 F.C.C.2d 3, 49-68 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting) (analyzing the development of the
1972 guidelines and the impact of FCC equal employment efforts) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Renewals]; see also Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Equal Employment Opportunity
Processing Guideline Modifications for Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 79 F.C.C.2d 922, 929
(1980) (discussing the 1972 guidelines).
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guidelines' standards devised by the FCC were lenient,4" however, such that
only stations with at least ten full-time workers that either employed no wo-
men or minority workers, or had a declining number of women or minority
workers, were subject to scrutiny.4 9
That same year, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit added a significant new component to be considered while
evaluating the processing guidelines. In Stone v. FCC,50 the plaintiffs, con-
tending that a station had enacted employment practices that were unfair to
blacks, argued that statistics showing a low minority rate relative to work
force availability demonstrated a prima facie case of employment discrimina-
tion and urged the Commission to reject license renewal. 5' The court re-
jected a challenge to the FCC's decision to renew the license, but explained
that its decision did not mean that "statistical evidence of an extremely low
rate of minority employment will never constitute a prima facie showing of
discrimination, or 'pattern of substantial failure to accord equal employment
opportunities.' "52 The court then found that the station's employment of
seven percent blacks was within the "zone of reasonableness" for the metro-
politan area,53 given the station's recruitment efforts.54 The FCC quickly
adopted the "zone of reasonableness" test, which necessitated an analysis
not of raw numbers, but of parity, that is, it compared a station's employ-
ment record with labor force availability in a large geographic area.55
During this period, a number of petitions to deny were filed, contending
that a station's license should not be renewed because women and minorities
48. FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, in reviewing an EEO study of radio and televi-
sion stations seeking license renewals in Pennsylvania and Delaware, noted that the 1972 stan-
dards were particularly lax in light of the fact that "[a]ll commissioners agree that no station
should have its license revoked because of a statistical analysis of its employment record." In
re Equal Employment Opportunity Inquiry, 36 F.C.C.2d 515, 517 (1972) (Johnson, Comm'r,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Commissioner Johnson urged the Commission to
adopt a more stringent compliance standard. Id. at 517-19. Commissioner Johnson later said
that the FCC's EEO regulations left the Commission "open to the charge that it is quietly
searching . . . for some course of action that would mollify critics without adversely affecting
its 'business as usual' rubber stamping of renewals." 1973 Renewals, 42 F.C.C.2d at 51 (foot-
note omitted).
49. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Inquiry Into the Employment Poli-
cies and Practices of Certain Broadcast Stations Located in Florida, 44 F.C.C.2d 735 (1974).
50. 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51. Id. at 320, 329-30.
52. Id. at 332. Uncontroverted evidence in Stone showed a 7% black employment rate by
a TV station in Washington, D.C., where about 70% of the population is black. The evidence
also showed, however, that the minority population of the entire Washington, D.C. metropoli-
tan area was only 24% black. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 329-30.
55. See, e.g., American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 98, 121-23 (1975).
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Catholic University Law Review
were underrepresented or underemployed. In evaluating underrepresenta-
tion claims, both the FCC and the courts held that the percentage of minor-
ity or female employees need not correspond directly to labor force
availability.56 In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that the FCC need not conduct a renewal hearing
unless it were presented with "substantial and specific" allegations, such as
evidence of actual discriminatory conduct.57 Similarly, complaints concern-
ing underutilization were rejected if it was shown that minorities and women
were employed in other than menial positions, particularly if the licensees
were able to show that they had a strong EEO program. 58 The decisions
stressed, however, that the "zone of reasonableness" test used to analyze
equal employment efforts is not static, 59 that the lax compliance standard
found in the 1972 guideline60 was not permanent, and that agency expecta-
tions would rise after stations had operated for a period of time under an
EEO plan. 6'
During the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court heard a case raising the same
issues, although in a different context, that critics of FCC affirmative action
efforts had posed. In this case involving the Federal Power Commission's
attempts to monitor the employment practices of regulatees, the Court held
that the public interest mandate of the Federal Power Commission (FPC)
did not authorize the agency to oversee employment activities.6 2 Therefore,
the Court held, discriminatory practices could be considered only to the ex-
tent such conduct was related directly to the agency's particular statutory
responsibilities.6 3 However, the Court noted:
56. See, e.g., Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 48 F.C.C.2d 1123 (1974).
57. Bilingual Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 629 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
58. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 46 F.C.C.2d 903 (1974); The Evening
News Ass'n, 35 F.C.C.2d 366 (1972).
59. See, e.g., Bilingual Bicultural Coalition of Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 492 F.2d 656,
659 (1974).
60. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
61. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Application of Mission Central Co., 54
F.C.C.2d 581 (1975), affd, 83 F.C.C.2d 330 (1980). The Commission stated that the
zone of reasonableness is a dynamic concept, which contracts as licensees are given
time in which to implement [the Commission's] antidiscrimination rules and policy
[and that therefore], a percentage of minority employment that once was held to fall
within a zone of reasonableness, in light of the licensee's affirmative action program,
might not still be contained in a contracted zone of reasonableness as interpreted
three years later.
Id. at 586.
62. NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 671 (1976).
63. Id.
[Vol. 35:807
Constitutionality of Affirmation Action Regulation
The Federal Communications Commission has adopted regula-
tions dealing with the employment practices of its regulatees.
These regulations can be justified as necessary to enable the FCC
to satisfy its obligation under the Communications Act of 1934
...to ensure that its licensees' programming fairly reflects the
tastes and viewpoints of minority groups.6 4
Although dicta, the statement has been quoted often by the FCC in defense
of its affirmative action efforts.
In 1976, following that decision, the FCC adopted a model EEO plan,
noting its precept was the programming nexus between equal employment
regulations and the public interest. 65 The Commission conceded that its au-
thority to regulate employment practices was grounded exclusively on a
finding of a nexus between station personnel and programming sensitive to
the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups.6 6 Abandoning the broad terms
of its 1968 policy statement, the Commission stated, "[w]e do not contend
that this agency has a sweeping mandate to further the national policy
,gainst discrimination, ' '67 and assured licensees that explanations about
poor EEO performances would be considered carefully. Further, the FCC
raised the ceiling below which it was not necessary to file affirmative action
plans from five to ten full-time workers. 68 This heightened review threshold
was subsequently rejected by a federal court, which found it arbitrary and
69capricious.
The following year, the FCC announced a more stringent processing stan-
dard for analyzing EEO compliance that incorporated the "zone of reasona-
bleness" test by establishing numerical parameters for monitoring
compliance. 70 Three years later, the FCC again revised the EEO processing
64. Id. at 670 n.7 (citations omitted).
65. See Report and Order, In re Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Prac-
tices of Broadcast Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d 226 (1976). The 1976 report adopted a 10-point
model EEO program and called upon licensees with more than 50 full-time employees to file
detailed employment profiles. Id. at 229.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Commission acknowledged that the "public interest" mandate of a federal
regulatory agency is "not a broad license to promote the general welfare, and that such a
mandate takes on specific content and meaning only when one carefully examines the purposes
for which the agency was established." Id.
68. See id. at 248.
69. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, 560 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1977).
70. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Equal Employment Opportunity Processing
Guideline Modifications for Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 79 F.C.C.2d 922 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1980 Guideline Modifications]. Under the 1977 guidelines, the FCC examined
employment units that failed to achieve 50% parity overall with local labor force availability
of minorities and women and 25% parity in the upper four job categories. Id. at 930. FCC
reporting forms use job categories determined by the Office of Management and Budget.
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guidelines, this time providing for stricter scrutiny of employment records
by raising the parity requirement, that is, the comparison of respective per-
centages in the relevant workforce with the percentage of minority or wo-
men employees at a particular station, to fifty percent of workforce
availability for upper level workers at large stations.7" The Commission did
not, however, set forth a policy rationale for its action.
The National Association of Broadcasters responded with a petition for
reconsideration,7 2 contending that the guidelines were unfair and unwar-
ranted, and constituted a quota system.7 3 In denying the NAB's petition,
the FCC detailed the purpose of the statistical measure:
We reiterate that [the processing guideline] is not a quota, and that
an employment profile which does not pass through the guideline
screening only triggers a staff-level EEO program review. The
lower guideline figure for smaller stations also is the basis of a
prima facie showing that the smaller licensee's employment of wo-
men and minorities is within a "zone of reasonableness." The use
of a lower figure in this context recognizes both the unique situa-
Those categories are: (a) officials and managers; (b) professionals; (c) technicians; (d) sales
persons; (e) office and clerical personnel; (f) skilled craft persons; (g) semiskilled operatives; (h)
unskilled laborers; and (i) service workers. As a result of the 1977 processing guidelines, about
60% of all station EEO programs were reviewed for compliance. Of these, about 80% were
cleared for further renewal processing without imposition of EEO-related sanctions. Id. at
924.
71. EEO Processing Guidelines Changed for Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 46 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1693 (1980). Under the 1980 processing guidelines, which govern FCC com-
pliance review currently,
(1) stations with less than five full-time employees continue to be exempt from hav-
ing a written EEO program; (2) stations with five to ten full-time employees have
their EEO programs reviewed if minority groups and/or women are not employed on
their full-time staffs at a ratio of 50% of their workforce availability overall and 25%
in the upper-four Form 395 job categories; (3) stations with 11 or more full-time
employees will have their EEO programs reviewed if minority groups and/or women
are not employed full time at a ratio of 50% of their availability in the workforce
overall and 50% in the upper-four job categories; and (4) all stations with 50 or more
full-time employees will have their EEO programs reviewed.
Id.
72. See 1980 Guideline Modifications, 79 F.C.C.2d at 922. Before filing the petition, the
NAB unsuccessfully sought resolution of the controversy in federal court. National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters v. FCC, dismissed mem., 610 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
73. See 1980 Guideline Modifications, 79 F.C.C.2d at 922-23. The NAB made three ma-
jor arguments in favor of reconsideration. It contended the guidelines were (1) "substantive
requirements which were improperly adopted without the benefit of the 'notice and com-
ment'" rulemaking procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) " 'discrimi-
natory, unfair, and unrealistic,' in part because they [did not] properly take into consideration
the actual workforce availability of women and minorities in the top four FCC Form 395 job
categories"; and (3) "unwarranted" because they ignored "the broadcast industry's EEO-re-
lated good faith efforts." Id.
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tion of small stations in hiring and retaining employees and the
Commission's cognizance of the limits of statistical tests as applied
to the smaller worksite. 4
Thus, according to the Commission, the guidelines are intended only to
identify those stations most likely to have violated the substantive rules.75 If
a station's statistical record falls outside the "zone of reasonableness," the
Commission conducts a more thorough investigation of the station's actual
recruitment and hiring practices. 76 In rare cases, the Commission has or-
dered an evidentiary hearing to consider a station's explanation for a poor
74. Id. at 931.
75. In recent years, the FCC has taken steps beyond equal employment regulations to
broaden minority influence over the airwaves. Working in tandem with Congress, the FCC
has devised structures through which minority ownership may be increased. See Garrett v.
FCC, 513 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1975); TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978);
WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 410-12 (1978); Communications Amendments Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat. 1087, 1094-95 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(i)(A), 309(i)(C)(ii)
(1982) (requiring that minority ownership program be incorporated into any lottery scheme
developed by the FCC as means for choosing among mutually exclusive applicants); H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41, 43-46 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2237, 2261 (endorsing minority ownership program and explaining new
statutory requirement that, if comparative hearing scheme is replaced with a lottery, minority
ownership program be incorporated into any future lottery scheme).
Specifically, the Commission has devised two programs to increase minority ownership.
First, the tax certificate program, authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1982), enables the seller
of a broadcast station to defer the gain realized upon a sale, by either (1) treating it as an
involuntary conversion, under 26 U.S.C. § 1033 (1982), with the recognition of gain avoided
by the acquisition of qualified replacement property; or (2) electing to reduce the basis of
property that can be depreciated under 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1982), or both.
Second, the distress sale policy allows a broadcaster whose licenses have been designated for
a revocation hearing, prior to commencement of the hearing, to sell his station to a minority-
owned or controlled entity for 75% of its fair market value. A broadcaster whose license has
been designated for hearing ordinarily would be prohibited from selling, assigning, or other-
wise disposing of his interest unless the issues were resolved his favor. Bartell Broadcasting of
Florida, Inc., 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1329, 1331 (1979).
Congress passed the minority preference legislation after finding "the effects of past inequi-
ties stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresenta-
tion of minorities in the media of mass communications." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, supra
note 75, at 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2287. The conference
report had noted that a December 1981 survey by the National Association of Broadcasters
revealed that of the 8,748 commercial broadcast stations in the United States, less than 2%
were minority owned and that of the 1,386 noncommercial stations only slightly more than
2% were minority owned. Id. 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2287.
Additionally, the Commission has revised its clear channel rules to enable preferential treat-
ment to minority owned AM stations. Report and Order, In re Clear Channel Broadcasting in
the AM Broadcasting Band, 78 F.C.C.2d 1345, recons. 83 F.C.C.2d 216 (1980), affid sub nom.
Loyola University v. FCC, 670 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
76. 1980 Guideline Modifications, 79 F.C.C.2d at 931.
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minority employment record. 7 Typically, however, when a station falls
outside the "zone," the FCC orders the licensee to submit detailed reports
documenting its affirmative action efforts.78
B. Expansion of Affirmative Action Regulation
To Include the Cable Industry
Noting that the multichannel capacity of cable television provided an
unique opportunity for minority expression, the FCC adopted rules in 1972
requiring that cable operators file affirmative action programs and annual
employment data. 79 Two years later, an FCC study of cable company em-
ployment records found that minorities and women were represented dispro-
portionately in the lesser skilled and lower paying jobs and were not hired in
numbers commensurate with availability.8° The results, the Commission
stated, demonstrated that cable EEO programs were not sufficiently active
and affirmative.8" To rectify that, the FCC proposed to use "goals and time-
tables" to monitor EEO compliance.
8 2
Cable companies responded by asserting that the FCC lacked jurisdiction
under either NAACP v. Federal Power Commission83 or under any reason-
able construction of the FCC's "ancillary" authority 84 to regulate cable in-
dustry employment practices. The FCC disagreed, finding ample authority
to require cable systems with five or more full-time workers to file an EEO
program. 85 The Commission also created a presumption that Standard Met-
ropolitan Statistical Measure (SMSA) data provided the relevant touchstone
77. See, e.g., New Mexico Broadcasting Co., Inc., 54 F.C.C.2d 126 (1975).
78. See, e.g., KCOP Television, Inc., 57 F.C.C.2d 227 (1975), affd, 73 F.C.C.2d 207, 211
(1979); Scott Broadcasting Corp., 52 F.C.C.2d 1029 (1975).
79. Report and Order, In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Require Opera-
tors of Community Antenna Television Systems and Community Antenna Relay Station
Licensees To Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment Practices, 34 F.C.C.2d 186
(1972). The Commission later conceded, however, that cable operators, unlike broadcasters,
have no affirmative duty to originate programming in the public interest. Report and Order,
Amendment of Part 76, Subpart 6, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations and Inquiry
into Development of Cablecasting Services, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
80. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies
and Practices of Cable Television Applicants and Certificate Holders and Licensees of Cable
Television Relay Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 618 (1976).
81. Id. at 620.
82. Id. at 625-26.
83. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
84. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (FCC authority to
require that cable systems originate programming and to make available facilities for local
production and programming derives from its ancillary jurisdiction); United States v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (upholding the FCC's authority over cable systems
insofar as it was reasonably ancillary to the regulation of television broadcasting).
85. Report and Order, In re Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices
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for determining whether a station was meeting its affirmative action obliga-
tions.16 It did, however, allow operators the opportunity to redefine the lo-
cal labor pool area where appropriate.8 7
Congress addressed many of the problematic issues concerning cable
transmission in the 1984 Cable Act, which established guidelines for regula-
tion of cable ownership, channel usage, franchising, rates, and service. It
also imposed EEO requirements including an annual compliance certifica-
tion process and periodic FCC investigation of cable employment prac-
tices."8 The Cable Act's EEO rules cut a wide swath; under section 634(a),
of Cable Television Applicants and Certificate Holders and Licensees of Cable Television Re-
lay Stations, 69 F.C.C.2d 1324, 1343 (1978).
86. The FCC acknowledged that there is no single definition of "local labor pool" and
suggested that each system must be examined in the context of its own circumstances and
location. Id. at 1342. It noted, however, the language from the Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing stating:
[W]here a system is situated in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), we
would consider the SMSA to be the local labor pool area for purposes of the availa-
bility survey. We also noted that where this was not the case, city or county-based
figures would suffice, and indicated appropriate sources for this data.
Id. at 1335 n.25.
87. Id. at 1341-42.
88. Section 634(c) of the Cable Act defines the scope of the EEO rules. The Act also sets
forth five EEO steps an entity must undertake:
(1) define the responsibility of each level of management to ensure a positive applica-
tion and vigorous enforcement of its policy of equal opportunity, and establish a
procedure to review and control managerial and supervisory performance;
(2) inform its employees and recognized employee organizations of the equal em-
ployment opportunity policy and program and enlist their cooperation;
(3) communicate its equal employment opportunity policy and program and its em-
ployment needs to sources of qualified applicants without regard to race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, age, or sex, and solicit their recruitment assistance on a
continuing basis;
(4) conduct a continuing program to exclude every form of prejudice or discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, national origin, age, or sex, from its personnel
policies and practices and working conditions; and
(5) conduct a continuing review of job structure and employment practices and
adopt a positive recruitment, training, job design, and other measures needed to en-
sure genuine equality of opportunity to participate fully in all its organizational units,
occupations, and levels of responsibility.
Cable Act, § 634(d)(2), 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(c) (West Supp. 1985).
Section 634(d)(2) of the Cable Act commands the FCC to devise rules requiring that each
cable entity:
(A) disseminate its equal opportunity program to job applicants, employees, and
those with whom it regularly does business;
(B) use minority organizations, organizations for women, media, educational institu-
tions, and other potential sources of minority and female applicants, to supply refer-
rals whenever jobs are available in its operation;
(C) evaluate its employment profile and job turnover against the availability of mi-
norities and women in its franchise area;
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they apply to "any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock com-
pany, or trust engaged primarily in the management or operation of any
cable system." 9 The controversial EEO provisions did not appear in the
first draft of the bill,9 ° which the Senate passed in June 1983. The House
Committee on Energy and Commerce filed a report in August 1984, how-
ever, recommending passage of a cable bill including provisions modeled af-
ter the FCC's existing EEO regulations and processing guidelines. 9' The
House report suggested use of a statistical parity standard even stricter than
that imposed on broadcasters. However, House committee members insisted
that the standard was not a quota system.9 2 For cable companies with five
to ten full-time workers, the standard required a parity level of fifty percent
of the local minority labor force standard. For companies with more than
ten full-time workers, the parity quota was raised to sixty percent.93 Addi-
tionally, special standards were set for the top four job categories. The
House report illustrated how the parity requirement was to operate94 and
recommended a $200-a-day penalty for violation as well as possible license
(D) undertake to offer promotions of minorities and women to positions of greater
responsibility;
(E) encourage minority and female entrepreneurs to conduct business with all parts
of its operation, and
(F) analyze the results of its efforts to recruit, hire, promote, and use the services of
minorities and women and explain any difficulties encountered in implementing its
equal employment opportunity program.
Cable Act, § 634(d)(2), 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
89. Cable Act, § 634(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(a) (West Supp. 1985).
90. See S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
91. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4655.
92. 130 CONG. REC. $14,289 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth) ("I wish
to make clear the legislation's intent that the failure to employ members of minority groups
and/or women at the prescribed parity levels does not in and of itself constitute a violation of
[the Cable Act].").
93. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 91, at 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4725.
94. The House Report explained:
Thus, for example, if the area's workforce consisted of 40 percent women, 20 percent
Black and 10 percent Asian Americans, their cable system's overall employment
among all employees in all job categories would have to be composed of at least 20
percent women, 10 percent Black and 5 percent Asian American, for a cable system
with more than five and less than eleven full-time employees.
The second measure of EEO compliance is computed in the same manner. Under
subparagraph (e)(1)(E), a cable system must employ a total number of women [and
minorities] among the top four job categories, so that the percentage of women [and
minorities] employed in the top four job categories is at least 50 percent (60 percent
for larger systems) of the total percentage of women [and minorities] in the area's
workforce. Taking the previous example, the percentage of all top four job category
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suspension.95 On October 1, 1984, the House approved H.R. 4103 and sent
it to the Senate.
96
In October 1984, a House and Senate conference committee convened to
draft a final version of the bill. The bill did not move forward, however,
until the House agreed to a compromise amendment introduced by Senator
Hatch which specifically deleted the provision for use of numerical parity.
97
It was only after this language, which the Senate believed suggested use of a
quota system, was deleted that the bill was passed and signed into law by the
President on Oct. 30, 1984.98
The Department of Justice contends that the FCC should be able to assure
compliance with EEO requirements based on submission of affirmative ac-
tion plans by cable entities without resorting to a numerical parity standard.
In a letter to the FCC, William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, said:
While the 1984 Act authorizes the Commission to collect certain
statistical data for its review, the changes made to section 634(e)
evince a clear Congressional intent that a numerical parity stan-
dard is not to be used to judge compliance.
Furthermore, there is no authority in the 1984 Act to justify
imposition of employment goals and timetables. Congress' objec-
tion to the use of numerical parity standards militates, a fortiori,
against vesting such authority in the Commission. Moreover, we
believe that race or gender-preferential employment policies under-
taken or compelled by public authorities, including the use of em-
ployment 'goals' in favor of nonvictims of discrimination and at
the expense of innocent third parties, violate the Constitution's
equal protection requirement. 99
In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC set forth plans for regulat-
ing EEO compliance in the cable industry.'O° It proposed requiring cable
workers that would have to be women would be 20 percent (50 percent of 40 per-
cent) ....
... That is, at least 20 percent of officials and managers, 20 percent of profession-
als, 20 percent of technicians, and 20 percent of sales persons would have to be wo-
men ....
Id. at 88-89, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4725-26.
95. Id. at 91-92, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4728-29.
96. S. 66 was amended to conform to H.R. 4103, passed in lieu thereof, and returned to
the Senate. 130 CONG. REC. H10,427 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984).
97. 130 CONG. REC. S14,450 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
98. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611).
99. Reynolds, supra note 15.
100. Implementation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Provisions of the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984, 50 FED. REG. I 1,191 (1984).
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operators to file annual employment reports, which would be checked for
EEO compliance, and if approved, a certificate of compliance would issue.' 1o
The most controversial proposal in the Notice was the announced intention
to apply "existing processing guidelines" to annual evaluation forms.' 2 The
Department of Justice responded by charging that the processing guidelines
constituted a quota system, favoring nonvictims of discrimination at the ex-
pense of innocent third parties.' 3 Similarly, the United States Commission
on Civil Rights stated that the proposed rules represented "an impermissible
construction of the [Cable] Act in view of Congress' deletion from an earlier
version of the Act of parity language nearly identical to the language which
you proposed by reference [to the existing broadcast processing guidelines]
to adopt.""' Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget stated that
much of the information collection suggested in the Notice was beyond the
scope of the 1984 Cable Act.'0 5 A number of groups representing women
and minorities, however, filed comments in support of the proposed cable
EEO rules.
Reaction to the Notice among members of Congress was mixed. Senator
Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Com-
mittee, complained:
[N]umerical standards have little in common with the language of
the Cable Act. As passed, the Act makes no reference to the use of
arbitrary, across-the-board numerical tests. In fact, specific lan-
guage was deleted from the Act during its consideration by Con-
101. Id. at 11,193.
102. Id. at 11,194.
103. In a letter to the FCC, William Bradford Reynolds, head of the Department of Jus-
tice's Civil Rights Division, asserted:
[B]ecause these documents contemplate that the commission may 1) use numerical
parity standards to gauge EEO compliance, and 2) require cable entities to establish
employment goals and timetables in certain circumstances, we believe the proposed
rule exceeds the authority given the Commission under the 1984 Act.
Congress did not intend that the Commission use a numerical standard to evaluate
disparities between the minority/female composition of a cable entity's workforce
and the composition of the relevant area labor market.
.... Furthermore, there is no authority in the 1984 Act to justify imposition of
employment goals and timetables .... Moreover, we believe that race or gender-
preferential employment policies undertaken or compelled by public authorities, in-
cluding the use of employment "goals" in favor of nonvictims of discrimination and
at the expense of innocent third parties, violate the Constitution's equal protection
requirement.
See supra note 15.
104. Comments of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Docket No. 85-61, at
page 1 (filed April 16, 1985).
105. Comments of the Office of Management and Budget, Docket No. 85-61, at 2-3 (filed
April 16, 1985).
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gress. No justification has been provided by the Commission to
warrant requiring the use of arbitrary standards ....
Senator Hatch also stated that the use of numerical standards constitutes
bad public policy "because they ultimately frustrate the very objectives they
are designed to achieve [and although] the tests allegedly are designed to
promote the development of a nondiscriminatory workplace, they instead
encourage race-conscious employment decisions."1 ° 7 He also chastised the
FCC for failing to provide an explanation as to why it chose
to ignore specific statutory language concerning the use of relevant
labor market data for each job category.
• . . [S]ince the primary standard to be met is fifty percent of
general labor force participation rates, no consideration is given to
the actual number of skilled individuals available for the position
in question. Consequently, the test may be impossible to meet for
the highly skilled positions, while, for other categories, it may be a
rigid ceiling on minority employment opportunities.' °8
Furthermore, Senator Hatch objected to the FCC's proposed rules because
they provided:
no explanation as to why cable operators should be treated differ-
ently than other entities regulated by the federal government. No
reason is given as to why the Commission feels it necessary to util-
ize a standard contrary to other federal affirmative action regula-
tions, such as those administered by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs.'0 9
Not surprisingly, Representatives Timothy E. Wirth, John D. Dingell,
and Mickey Leland reacted more favorably to the bill. Their interpretation
of the statute and the effect that the compromise amendment had on it dif-
fered significantly from that of Senator Hatch." 0 In a letter to the FCC
Chairman Mark Fowler, they stated:
Some parties offering comments to this proceeding have argued
that since the compromise EEO provision enacted did not include
certain House passed provisions which contained numerical per-
centages, this evidenced a legislative intent to prohibit the use of
106. Letter from Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Committee on Labor and Human
Resources to Mark Fowler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (June 28, 1985).
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis in original).
109. Id.
110. Letter from Reps. Timothy E. Wirth, John D. Dingell, and Mickey Leland, House of
Representatives, to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (June
19, 1985).
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numerical processing guidelines by the FCC in carrying out its
EEO functions. We want to make clear this is not the case.
Although differences of opinion exist as to whether the FCC's
current processing guidelines are adequate as a means of achieving
affirmative action goals, we wish to stress that there was no inten-
tion on the part of the Congress to disturb the present use of the
FCC's processing guidelines as an objective administrative tool in
monitoring EEO compliance.
In fact, all Congressional parties involved with the drafting of
this section of the Cable Act understood and anticipated that the
legislation adopted would permit the Commission to continue to
utilize processing guidelines in monitoring cable industry EEO
compliance. "'
In conclusion, these congressmen stated their belief that the FCC's EEO
regulations were permissible under the Cable Act.
In the Report and Order..2 adopted during September 1985, the Commis-
sion slightly modified the certification process.' 13 Although the language of
the Cable Act specifically states that compliance is to be assessed in light of
availability of minorities and women in the franchise area labor force, the
Report and Order uses SMSA data" 14 in which the operator's employment
office is located, as a point of comparison.' If the employment office is not
located in an MSA, the county in which it is located will be used." 6 Head-
quarters units will be allowed to use national labor force statistics for the top
four categories and local data for the lower four categories." 7 In order for
111. Id.
112. Report and Order, In re Amendment To Implement the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Provisions, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,836 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. Part 76).
113. In an effort to address the paperwork burden imposed by the certification in a manner
acceptable to the Office of Management and Budget, the FCC modified the reporting format to
conform with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's) forms. Id. at
40,841. The Report and Order also eliminated the separate reporting form for part-time work-
ers, id. at 40,841 n.24, but maintained the requirement that cable entities enter the number of
employees in each job category, by sex, race, or national origin. Id. at 40,841. It also called
for annual certification based on satisfactory completion of a modified Form 395A, which asks
for information about hires and promotions and for a list of minority recruitment sources
contacted by the cable operators over a twelve-month period. Id. at 40,844. Then every five
years, in lieu of Form 395A, cable entities would be required to submit a Supplemental Investi-
gation Sheet, including an employee list describing each worker's primary duties and responsi-
bilities and breaking down personnel decisions by sex, race, and national origin. Id. at 40,849-
50, 40,861.
114. The Census Department now uses the term MSA to refer to areas previously desig-
nated as SMSAs. See supra note 44.
115. 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,843.
116. Id.
117. Id. For an explanation of the categories, see supra note 70.
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an operator to use demographic data other than MSA statistics, he must
make a showing including information such as
(a) the distance of the employment unit from areas of minority
concentration in the MSA is great; (b) commuting from those areas
to the cable unit is difficult (such difficulties will usually be based
on distance but may also be based on other factors such as lack of
transportation); or (c) that recruitment efforts directed at the MSA
minority labor force have been fruitless.1" 8
The Report and Order also requires cable entities to submit data detailing
hiring, promotion and recruitment decisions by categories. The Commission
claims collection of this data is mandated by section 634(d)(2)(6) of the 1984
Cable Act, requiring the Commission to analyze "efforts to recruit, hire, pro-
mote, and use the services of minorities and women.""' 9
To comply with the congressional directive that the FCC conduct investi-
gations every five years, the agency plans to conduct a trend analysis using
annual statistical employment reports. 2 0 Commenters including the Ameri-
can Legal Foundation, the Department of Justice, and the Commission on
Civil Rights have asserted that the method the FCC has selected for evaluat-
ing EEO compliance is unconstitutional.' 2 1 In response, the FCC stated,
"the arguments raised . . . rest essentially on the premise that the Commis-
sion's use of processing guidelines is a quota system, [however, these] guide-
118. 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,843. To support its decision to allow a deviation from use of
SMSA data, the FCC cited past precedent, comparing Renewals of Indiana, Kentucky and
Tennessee Broadcast Stations (WHIN/WWKX, Gallatin, TN.), 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1473, 1484 (1983), with Media-Corn, Inc. (WDBN-FM), 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1291, 1294
(1984). In the first case the FCC declined to allow use of alternative data because no showing
had been made relative to the licensee's efforts in Nashville, while in the second case, WDBN-
FM made a substantial documented showing that indicated the distance from areas of minority
concentration to the station was a mitigating factor. See also Letter from Glenn A. Wolfe,
Chief, Equal Employment Opportunity Branch, Mass Media Bureau, EEOC, to Jerry Haines,
Esq., dated April 3, 1984 (station in Port Huron, Michigan, may use St. Clair County data
rather than Detroit PMSA). In each of these cases, however, the applicant had to overcome a
strong presumption that SMSA data was the appropriate reference point.
119. 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,839.
120. Specific complaints of discrimination will still be filed initially with the EEOC. In
1978, the Commission resolved some of the questions concerning the overlap of authority be-
tween the FCC and the EEOC after the two agencies entered into a memorandum of under-
standing regarding the exchange of information and the disposition of complaints filed by
licensees. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Communications Commis-
sion and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 70 F.C.C.2d 2320 (1978). That
memorandum of understanding with the EEOC is being amended to provide for orderly filing
of discrimination complaints against cable companies. 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,862, Appendix D.
121. See supra notes 15, 104 and accompanying text. Comments from the American Legal
Foundation, Docket No. 85-61, at 3-7 (filed June 19, 1985).
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lines are clearly not intended to be used for any such purpose." '122 The
constitutionality of the processing guidelines must be evaluated in considera-
tion of federal case law governing administrative agency discretion and af-
firmative action efforts.
C. The Delegation Issue: Do the Affirmative Action Regulations for the
Cable Industry Exceed the FCC's Statutory Authority?
Before judging the validity of equal employment opportunity regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, the
threshold question of whether the Commission exceeded its statutory au-
thority must be resolved. This threshold issue must be examined in view of
the deletion of language in the Cable Act calling for a numerical parity sys-
tem.123 If the FCC is determined to have exceeded its statutory authority in
issuing those regulations, a court could invalidate them on that ground,
without reaching the equal protection argument. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, '2 4 the Supreme Court held:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the ab-
sence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute.'
25
The silence of the Cable Act on the use of employment quotas means that a
reviewing court would have to answer the second question posed by the
Supreme Court: Whether the FCC's EEO regulations are based on a per-
missible construction of the statute.
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court addressed the question of statutory
construction where language had been deleted. In Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 126 it stated, "[tihe fact that [a] provi-
122. 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,846.
123. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
124. 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
125. Id. at 2781-82 (footnotes omitted).
126. 230 U.S. 184 (1913).
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sion. . . was omitted from [an] Act, as finally. . . passed, is not only signif-
icant, but . . . conclusive" against a claim that language elsewhere in the
same Act "means the same thing as the omitted clause." 2 ' More recently,
the Supreme Court held that deletion of a provision from legislation prior to
passage "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a re-
sult that it expressly declined to enact." 128
Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly that an agency may
not expand enforcement of its regulations beyond the limits set by Con-
gress. 129 Traditionally, the FCC has been granted broad authority to act in
the "public interest."' 13 However, the Supreme Court has found that Con-
gress did not intend the Communications Act "to transfer [Congress'] legis-
lative power to the unbounded discretion of the regulatory body."'' This is
a variation of the delegation doctrine,' 32 which enables Congress to delegate
powers to agencies only after setting standards to guide their determination.
An agency's authority to enact and enforce regulations, therefore, is limited
by the "obligation to honor the clear meaning of [the] statute, as revealed by
its language, purpose, and history."' 33 Recently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that "[a]pplication of the
plain meaning rule [of statutory interpretation] does not preclude considera-
127. Id. at 198-99. See also Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430, 436-37 (1916) (declining to
interpret a statute as including language Congress refused to include before passage).
128. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
129. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979) (for a regulation to
have the force of law it must be the product of a congressional grant of legislative authority).
130. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (The public interest standard is not inflexible, but is susceptible to
"the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting and [to] the
corresponding requirement that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to ad-
just itself to these factors.").
131. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953). Although the FCC can,
as part of its public interest standard, take economic factors into consideration, it is free to
ignore the policies favoring competition that serve as the foundation of the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts if to do so would be in the public interest, convenience and necessity. Id. at 90. See
also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (finding the public
interest standard is "not to be interpreted as setting up a standard so indefinite as to confer an
unlimited power" (quoting Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Co., 289 U.S. 266,
285 (1933)).
132. In its entire history, the Supreme Court has struck down only two statutes on the
ground of improper delegation of power. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 3.2,
at 151 (1978). See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (declaring § 9(c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933), to be an unconstitutional delega-
tion of authority from Congress to the President); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Congress not permitted by the Constitution to abdicate the essen-
tial legislative functions with which it is vested).
133. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979) (quoting Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979)).
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tion of persuasive legislative history" regarding the statute's meaning. 134
Should the FCC's action be challenged in court, the Commission would have
to show its decision was supported by "substantial evidence."' 35 The court
then would conduct a "searching and careful" analysis to determine if the
FCC's action was rational and based on consideration of relevant factors. 1
36
Recently, the validity of FCC regulations imposed to govern award of spe-
cial preferences for racial and ethnic minorities through the use of weighed
lotteries1 37 has been subject to such review. In 1983, the FCC announced
that all pending applications in the low power television and television trans-
lator service would be subject to a lottery and that race and diversity would
be awarded a fixed relative preference of two to one. 138 Critics of weighed
lotteries, including FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler, contend that this race-
conscious policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution be-
cause there have been no findings of discrimination in the broadcast indus-
try, the preference system is not narrowly tailored to reflect the extent of
past discrimination, and the EEO regulation is not subject to continuing
134. Belland v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 726 F.2d 839, 844 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
135. Under § 706(2)(E) of the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency's findings and
conclusions made pursuant to formal rulemaking procedures, such as that used in the Equal
Employment Opportunity proceeding, must be supported by "substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(E) (1982).
136. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).
The standard for judicial review is determined largely by § 706 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, which requires a reviewing court to strike "agency action, findings, and conclusions"
found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). Under this standard of review, agency action is presump-
tively valid, and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, so
long as a rational basis exists for the agency action. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (en banc) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also New York State Comm'n on
Cable Television v. FCC, 669 F.2d 58, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1982) (FCC was not arbitrary and capri-
cious in finding that regulation by a state commission of master antenna television systems
affected interstate commerce); American Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 617 F.2d 875, 879
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding FCC rules prohibiting manufacture and sale of certain amplifiers
capable of use by citizens band operators because they were "neither arbitrary, capricious,
irrational nor unreasonable").
137. Congress has approved development of a random lottery system as an alternative to
costly and time consuming comparative hearings. In so doing, it has expressly sanctioned
incorporation of significant minority preferences into the system, without regard to the size or
existence of a minority population in the community of license. Communications Amend-
ments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat. 1087, 1094-95 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 309(i)(3)(A), (C)(iii) (1982).
138. Only applicants whose owners control no other media of mass communications are
entitled to the 2-to-1 preference; those controlling one, two, or three media outlets are entitled
to a 1.5-to-I preference. Second Report and Order, In re Amendment of the Commission's
Rules To Allow the Selection from Among Certain Competing Applications Using Random
Selection or Lotteries Instead of Comparative Hearings, 93 F.C.C.2d 952, 953 (1983).
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oversight. 139
In an August 1985 case challenging the validity of granting comparative
advantage to female applicants, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit struck down the FCC's female preference sys-
tem. " The court found that in adopting the female preference system, the
FCC exceeded its statutory authority; therefore, it did not reach the consti-
tutional question raised.14 ' In a far-reaching opinion, Judge Tamm, writing
for the majority, attacked not only the female but also the minority lottery
preference system.' 4 2 The court concluded, however, that minority prefer-
ences stand on firmer footing than a female merit system because there has
been no clear congressional endorsement of the FCC's female preference pol-
icy. 143 Moreover, the court found it unreasonable to believe that granting a
preference to women will increase programming diversity since women
"transcend ethnic, religious, and other cultural barriers.' 44 The Commis-
sion has declined to appeal the decision.
139. Id. at 1017-18 (1983) (separate statement of Fowler, Comm'r).
140. Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
141. Id. at 1193. The Supreme Court has applied a "strict scrutiny" analysis only to classi-
fications based on race or national origin. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); see also Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978). In contrast, the Supreme Court has applied a
lower degree of scrutiny to classifications based on gender. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197-99 (1976), Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion). In part,
the reason for application of the strict scrutiny standard is historic. The fourteenth amend-
ment was adopted in part to end racial discrimination. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 306-07 (1879); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1872). A similar
attempt to end discrimination against women through passage of the equal rights amendment
failed. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971).
142. In dicta, Judge Tamm wrote:
The minority preference rests on the assumptions that first, membership in an eth-
nic minority causes members of that minority to have distinct tastes and perspectives
and, second, that these differences will consciously or unconsciously be reflected in
distinctive editorial and entertainment programming. . . . [I]t is questionable
whether a black station owner would program soul rather than classical music or
that he would manifest a distinctively "black" editorial viewpoint. Indeed, to make
such an assumption concerning an individual's tastes and viewpoints would seem to
us mere indulgence in the most simplistic kind of ethnic stereotyping.
With respect to the second assumption, one would think that station owners-
motivated primarily by the desire to turn a profit-would be more influenced in their
programming decisions by the tastes, interests, and perspectives of the listening audi-
ence than by those tastes and perspectives perhaps attributable to their ethnic
backgrounds.
770 F.2d at 1198.
143. Id. at 1196 n.4.
144. Id. at 1199.
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D. Bakke, Fullilove and Stotts: The Equal Protection Backdrop
As previously stated, the Justice Department has taken the position that
use of broadcast processing guidelines to evaluate cable industry EEO efforts
is unconstitutional. It contends that the processing guidelines constitute a
quota system that arbitrarily diminishes the chances that white workers will
be hired for jobs for which they are the best qualified candidate.
145
This contention must be examined in view of the Supreme Court's consti-
tutional analysis of discrimination during the past decade and the standards
it has set for evaluating the propriety of preferential systems. In particular,
the decisions in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 46 Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 147 and Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 148 have pro-
vided guidance as to the standards that must be met to create a constitution-
ally valid affirmative action program.' 49
In Bakke, the Supreme Court considered for the first time the merits of a
party's contention that a governmental remedial program providing a racial
preference violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 50 In that case, a closely divided Supreme Court struck down an af-
firmative action plan that denied a white applicant an opportunity for
admission to medical school solely because of his race. The plan reserved
sixteen of the one hundred places available in the first-year class at the Medi-
cal School of the University of California at Davis for minority candi-
dates. "'' This "quota" allowed blacks and other minorities to be admitted to
the school with paper credentials, such as undergraduate grades and board
scores, lower than those of the white plaintiff who was denied admission.'
The California Supreme Court, in a six-to-one decision, found that the
Davis affirmative action plan violated the equal protection clause and pro-
hibited the university from utilizing a race-conscious admissions plan. The
court noted that the case ordinarily would be remanded for further consider-
145. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
146. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
147. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
148. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
149. For cases examining a variety of government affirmative action programs in light of
the rationales of various opinions in Bakke and Fullilove, see South Florida Chapter of Associ-
ated Gen. Contractors v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 220 (1984); Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983); Schmidt
v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 662 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 457 U.S. 594 (1982); M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
150. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The reverse discrimination issue was raised once before, but
dismissed as moot. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
151. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
152. Id. at 275 & n.4, 279 n.12.
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ation of the remedy because Bakke's showing of an equal protection viola-
tion shifted the burden to the university to demonstrate that he would not
have been admitted even without the special admissions program.' 53 The
California Supreme Court stated, however, that on appeal the university
conceded it could not meet that burden, and, consequently, the court or-
dered that Bakke be admitted to the medical school.' 54 The university then
appealed both parts of the decision.
The Supreme Court, in Bakke, produced two five-to-four decisions, each
supported by a majority comprised of different Justices. Justice Powell, the
only Justice participating in both majorities,' 5" affirmed the California
Supreme Court's decision insofar as it ordered Bakke's admission and invali-
dated the special admissions program.' 56 A different group of Justices, how-
ever, reversed the judgment prohibiting Davis from considering race as a
factor in its admissions decisions.1
57
Before addressing the constitutional questions raised by the case, the
Court examined the basic statutory issues revolving around the meaning of
the command in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that "[n]o person
• ..shall, on the ground of race,. . . be subjected to discrimination under
any program .. .receiving Federal financial assistance."' 58 Justices Ste-
vens, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger took the position that the
Davis program violated title VI, which they read to impose an absolute ban
on consideration of race in the admission process.' 59 Accordingly, they con-
cluded, it was unnecessary to decide the constitutionality of the Davis sys-
tem because title VI barred educational institutions receiving federal funds
from discriminating on the basis of race."
The five other justices found that title VI's prohibition against discrimina-
153. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 63-64, 553 P.2d 1152, 1172, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680, 700 (1976).
154. 18 Cal. 3d at 63-64, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
155. Justice Powell joined Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stevens and Stew-
art to invalidate the Davis special admissions program and ordered Bakke admitted to the
school. He also joined a second group composed of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun to hold that race may be a consideration in a constitutionally accepted admissions
program.
156. 438 U.S. at 320 (Powell, J.).
157. Id. at 320 (Powell, J.), 379 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
158. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1982)). Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in
federally assisted programs. Id. Notably, the university acknowledged that it receives federal
financial assistance. 438 U.S. at 412. Title VI does not specifically bar employment discrimi-
nation based on sex, but some federal agencies have barred such discrimination in their
regulations.
159. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412-21.
160. Id.
1986]
Catholic University Law Review
tion is no broader than the equal protection clause. Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun found that title VI was designed to eliminate fed-
eral funding for programs in which minorities are disadvantaged in violation
of the equal protection clause.16 ' Justice Powell was the only justice to
reach the constitutional issue, but he joined the Stevens group in its conclu-
sion that the Davis program was unlawful.' 6 z This interpretation of the
scope of title VI then required the Court to look beyond the statutory analy-
sis and examine how the equal protection clause applied to the case.
Although five justices agreed that the case involved application of the
equal protection clause, they did not agree on the level of constitutional
scrutiny required. Justice Powell concluded racial classifications are "inher-
ently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."'
' 63
Under his strict scrutiny test, he found remedies fixing minority preferences
that harmed one group to the benefit of another to be permissible only where
there have been "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings" of specific
instances of discrimination."' 4 Additionally, he found that remedial action
should be subject to "continuing oversight to assure that it will work the
least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit."' 65
In conclusion, the Bakke decision held that a racial quota will not win judi-
cial support if it is not based on specific findings of past racial discrimination,
if the minorities receiving the benefit were not themselves victimized by spe-
cific discriminatory action, and if identifiable whites who did not themselves
contribute to the discriminatory policy are seriously harmed. The Davis
plan failed all three tests. Justice Powell stated his belief, however, that an
admissions program similar to that used at Harvard University would pass
constitutional muster if it used race as one factor in achieving diversity
among students, so long as it was not the sole criteria.
166
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with Justice
Powell that affirmative action programs are permissible under the fourteenth
amendment.167 Justice White also agreed with Justice Powell that affirma-
161. Id. at 341-50 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). Justice White wrote sepa-
rately to explain his view that a private cause of action does not exist under title VI. Id. at 379-
87.
162. Id. at 289-320 (Powell, J.).
163. Id. at 291.
164. Id. at 307. Justice Powell found that "[w]ithout such findings of constitutional or
statutory violations, it cannot be said that the government has any greater interest in helping
one individual than in refraining from harming another. Thus, the government has no compel-
ling justification for inflicting such harm." Id. at 308-09.
165. Id. at 308.
166. Id. at 316-18.
167. Id. at 325-26 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
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tive action plans required strict scrutiny.' 6 Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, however, relied on an intermediate level of scrutiny,
finding that "racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes
'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives.' ,169 They would have upheld the
Davis program as substantially related to an important governmental inter-
est: overcoming significant and chronic minority underrepresentation in the
medical profession.' 70 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stevens,
and Stewart did not consider the level of scrutiny required because they de-
termined that the special admissions program violated title VI by allowing
exclusion based upon race. 
1 71
Two years later, in Fullilove, a closely divided Supreme Court upheld the
"set aside" requirement of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,172
requiring ten percent of federal funds granted for local public works projects
be used to procure the services of "minority business enterprises."1 73 As in
Bakke, the Supreme Court in Fullilove produced a highly fragmented judg-
ment. Three varying views emerged among those justices voting to uphold
the statute. 174 Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the lead opinion concurred
in by Justices White and Powell, indicated that a two-part test had to be
satisfied before the race-conscious program could be found valid. 175 First,
the Court must find the objectives of the legislation within the powers of
Congress. 176 In this regard, Chief Justice Burger found the set aside require-
ment within the scope of Congress' spending power. 177 He also found that
168. Id. at 387 n.7 (White, J.).
169. Id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (quoting Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)). This intermediate level of scrutiny has been employed by the Court
in sex discrimination cases. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
170. 438 U.S. at 362, 366, 369-71 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.).
171. Id. at 421 (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, Stevens, & Stewart, JJ.).
172. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, § 103, 91 Stat. 116, 117
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1982)).
173. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490-92.
174. Chief Justice Burger declared that Congress need not proceed in a wholly "color-
blind" fashion when acting to ensure that expenditures under the Public Works Act of 1977
did not perpetuate racial discrimination in the construction industry. Id. at 482, 475-76. Jus-
tice Powell, in a separate concurrence, voted to uphold the Public Works Act because Con-
gress had the authority to remedy discriminatory practices, had made sufficient findings of
fact, and had employed a narrowly drawn means to accomplish its goal. Id. at 495-517. Jus-
tices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, using the same equal protection test they employed in
Bakke, found that the set-aside scheme was constitutional because it was "substantially related
to the achievement of the important and congressionally articulated goal of remedying the
present effects of past racial discrimination." Id. at 521.
175. Id. at 473.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 475.
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Congress had a rational basis for concluding that if uncorrected, subcon-
tracting practices would make it difficult for minorities to enter into public
contracts, and would thereby perpetuate the effects of prior discrimina-
tion.' 78 Therefore, he found that Congress could regulate such remedial ac-
tivity under the commerce clause of the Constitution179 without showing
that prime contractors were guilty of actual violations of antidiscrimination
laws.
Second, the Chief Justice stated that the court must determine whether
the use of ethnic and racial criteria was a constitutionally permissible means
of achieving congressional objectives. 180 Burger concluded that the use of
racial and ethnic classifications are permissible when Congress is exercising
its authority to enforce equal protection guarantees.18 ' He was not troubled
by the effect the set-aside might have on nonminority firms because the pro-
gram was limited in duration and the remedy was narrowly tailored to cure
the defects of past discrimination.' 82 He declined, however, to adopt either
a strict or intermediate scrutiny standard, stating only that any preference
based on race "must necessarily receive a most searching examination to
make sure it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees."'
' 83
Justice Powell's concurrence reiterated his view that strict scrutiny is the
proper standard of review for affirmative action programs.' 84 This ap-
proach, stating that the racial classification must be a necessary means of
advancing a compelling governmental interest,' 85 requires both specific find-
ings of past discrimination and a narrowly drawn remedy that is "equitable
and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination." 186
Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell emphasized that the statute
178. Id. at 477-78.
179. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
180. Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 473.
181. Id. at 490-91.
182. Id. at 484. Chief Justice Burger noted that the administrative scheme provided a
mechanism by which nonminority firms could seek a waiver or exemption from the Public
Works Act if their best efforts at compliance with this legislation were unsuccessful. Id. at
487-88.
183. Id. at 491-92. Interestingly, Justice White, who joined Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Marshall in Bakke, joined Chief Justice Burger in Fullilove. It is unclear whether this
indicates a shift in his view on the requirements of the equal protection clause.
184. Id. at 496.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 498, 510. Justice Powell also outlined five factors to consider in determining
whether a race-conscious remedy satisfies the strict scrutiny test: (1) the efficacy of alternative
remedies; (2) the planned duration of the remedy; (3) the relationship between the number of
minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the rele-
vant population or work force; (4) the availability of waiver provisions; and (5) the effect of the
remedy on third parties. Id. at 510-14.
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in Fullilove was based on congressional findings and for that reason should
be judged with deference. Their statements suggested that the constitution-
ally acceptable means of redressing past discrimination vary with the intent
of the Congress.' 87
In their concurrence, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun stated
their belief that an intermediate standard of review, requiring that the use of
benign racial classifications be "substantially related" to an "important and
articulated" government purpose, was appropriate.1 88 Based on that stan-
dard, they found that the minority set-aside plan was permissible after find-
ing it was substantially related to the compelling congressional objective.' 89
In both Bakke and Fullilove, they argued that strict scrutiny was applicable
only when an ethnic or racial classification stigmatizes a race and not when
it only disadvantages a class, such as whites, lacking the "traditional indicia
of suspectness. '190
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, articulating again
the view that the Constitution should be color-blind, tolerating no classes
among citizens.' 9 ' No preferences should be awarded, they said, unless or-
dered by the court for the "sole purpose . . . [of eradicating] the actual ef-
fects of illegal race discrimination."' 92 Justice Stevens filed a separate
dissenting opinion challenging the imprecise manner in which Congress
granted preferential rights in response to minimally articulated findings of
actual discrimination.
19 3
In Firefighters Local Union v. Stotts, 194 Earl Stotts, a black Memphis
187. Chief Justice Burger said:
Here we deal . . . not with the limited remedial powers of a federal court, for exam-
ple, but with the broad remedial powers of Congress. It is fundamental that in no
organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive re-
medial power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with com-
petence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees.
Id. at 483; see also id. at 515-16 & n.14 (Powell, J., concurring).
188. 448 U.S. at 521.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 518 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357). This position seems based on the view
that the effects of discrimination against minorities, especially Blacks, is so pervasive that re-
medial efforts are required to achieve equality.
191. Id. at 522-23.
192. Id. at 528.
193. See id. at 539-41. Justice Stevens rejected the view that racial classifications are abso-
lutely prohibited. Id. at 548. Instead, he wrote, the courts must examine "the procedural
character of the decisionmaking process" to determine the validity of a classification. Id. at
551. In this case, Justice Stevens found that Congress had failed not only to identify the char-
acteristics of minority business enterprises, but also to show that the preference system was
narrowly tailored to a legitimate objective. Id. at 548-54.
194. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
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firefighter filed a class action suit in federal district court charging that fire
department and city officials were engaging in a pattern or practice of mak-
ing hiring and promotion decisions on the basis of race, in violation of title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That suit was consolidated with an
action filed by Mr. Jones, also a black member of the fire department, who
claimed he had been denied a promotion on racial grounds.' 95 In 1980, the
district court approved a consent decree designed to settle these cases by
adopting a long-term goal of increasing the proportion of minority represen-
tation in numerous job classifications. 196 The city expressly stated, however,
that by signing the decree, it did not admit to the allegations contained in the
complaints. 97
In 1981, faced with projected budget deficits, the city announced that lay-
offs of nonessential personnel would be conducted under the traditional "last
hired, first fired" seniority system.1 98 The district court, however, enjoined
use of the seniority system. Although the court explicitly found that the
system was not adopted with an intent to discriminate, it nevertheless would
have issued the injunction on the grounds that the system had a racially
discriminatory effect.' 99 A modified layoff plan was designed under court
order and, as a result, white workers with more seniority than their black co-
workers were laid off, although the otherwise applicable seniority system
would have called for the layoff of black employees. 2" On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the
injunction to be a valid means of either enforcing or modifying the decree,
despite its effect on those with vested rights under the city's seniority sys-
tem.2 ° ' It reached that conclusion despite its holding that the district court
had erroneously determined that the city's seniority system was not bona
fide.
202
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice White, writing for the majority in a
six-three decision, found that the injunction was improper either as an en-
forcement of the original consent decree or as a modification of the de-
cree.211 Initially, the majority found that the district court had exceeded its
195. Id. at 2581.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2581-82.
199. Id. at 2582.
200. Id.
201. 679 F.2d 541, 563-64 (6th Cir. 1982).
202. Id. at 551 n.6, 565-66.
203. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurrence. 104 S. Ct. at 2590-94. Justice Stevens con-
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authority by enjoining the city's use of the seniority system. 2" The Court
stated that examination of the plain terms of the decree, which was silent on
the issue of layoffs and demotions, revealed the fallacy of the claim that the
city merely was enforcing the 1980 consent decree.20 5 Additionally, the
Court found that because title VII protects seniority systems, the district
court had erred in presuming that the parties to the decree had intended to
alter the "last hired, first fired" system absent an explicit expression to that
effect.2 ° 6 Moreover, the Court noted, neither the union nor the white work-
ers were parties to the suit when the consent decree was signed and, there-
fore, could not have consented to that change.20 7
Next, the Court found the order could not have been upheld as a valid
modification of the decree because it conflicted with two provisions of title
VII.20 8 First, the Court found that the modified decree was in conflict with
the seniority protection provision found in section 703(h) of the Act.20 9
Under that section, a white worker with seniority under a contractually es-
tablished seniority system cannot be displaced absent either a finding that
the system was adopted with a discriminatory intent or a determination that
a proven victim of discrimination was entitled to a make-whole remedy.2 1°
Noting that the district court had found that the layoffs were not motivated
by an intent to discriminate and that none of the beneficiaries of the modified
decree were proven victims of past discrimination, the Court found that the
alternative layoff system violated title VII.2 11 Second, the Court found that
the modified consent decree also conflicted with section 706(g) of title VII,
which states that the court can award competitive seniority only when the
beneficiary is an actual victim of illegal discrimination.212 By limiting judi-
curred in the judgment, but wrote separately to express his view that the Court's treatment of
the title VII issue was advisory. Id. at 2594-95.
204. Id. at 2585-86.
205. Id. at 2586.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2587 & n.9. The Court relied on Systems Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642
(1961), to support its ruling that a district court cannot modify a title VII consent decree over
the objection of one of the parties, if the resulting decree conflicts with the statute underlying
the consent decree. Id. In Systems Fed'n, the Court held that when the term of a decree
conflicts with the statute under which it was entered due to a change in the law, the decree
should be modified despite the objection of the parties bound by the order. 364 U.S. at 651.
209. Stotts, 104 U.S. at 2587. See Civil Rights Act, tit. VII, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1982).
210. Stotts, 104 U.S. at 2587 n.9, 2588 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)).
211. Id. at 2588-90.
212. Id. Section 706(g), which provides for title VII remedies, states in part:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as
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cial authority to order make-whole relief to those cases where actual victim
status can be demonstrated, the Court seems to have expanded the standard
of proof required in cases examining seniority and merit systems under sec-
tion 703(h) and to have applied it to all discrimination cases brought under
section 706(g).2 13
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall in a vigorous
dissent, was critical of the level of judicial review, contending that the major-
ity analyzed the lower court's action as if it were a decision on the merits,
rather than a preliminary injunction.2 14 In so doing, Blackmun contended,
the majority prematurely concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove
that the city had violated its duty to act in good faith and that the layoffs
undermined the decree.21 5
The dissent also strongly disagreed with the finding that the modified de-
cree violated title VII; Blackmun asserted that if black firefighters had pre-
vailed on their class-action claim of pattern-or-practice discrimination, they
would have been entitled to race-conscious affirmative relief without proof of
actual victim status.216 If the firefighters had prevailed on the merits, Black-
mun stated, they would have been entitled to reinstatement, backpay, "or
any other equitable relief as the Court deem[ed] appropriate.,
217
In light of the diversity of views among Supreme Court members-and in
the absence of a clear statement on what are and are not permissible affirma-
tive action efforts, it is difficult to articulate a precise methodology for evalu-
ating the validity of affirmative action programs. However, Bakke, Fullilove,
and Stotts suggest a three-part analysis to address the concerns confronting
the Court. First, there must have been adequate findings that discrimination
existed in the subject industry to ensure the agency is not merely advancing
the interests of one racial or ethnic group interest over another.2' Second, a
remedial program must be narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past
a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as
an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused
admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin or in violation of § 704(a) of this title.
Civil Rights Act, tit. VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) (1982).
213. See supra notes 209, 212; see also Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV.
87, 272 (1984) (noting that the Court's expanded proof standard was extensively reported in
the popular press because of its potential impact on all court-ordered affirmative action
programs).
214. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2595-600 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting.).
215. Id. at 2603-04.
216. Id. at 2605-07.
217. Id. at 2605 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982)).
218. See supra notes 164, 178, 186-87, 193 and accompanying text.
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discrimination without excluding innocent groups or depriving individuals
of vested rights.2 19 Third, the program must be subject to continuing reas-
sessment to assure that it will cause the least possible harm to innocent third
parties in the short-run and that it will not continue in duration beyond the
point needed to redress the effects of past discrimination.22 °
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FCC's USE OF EXISTING
PROCESSING GUIDELINES To MONITOR EEO COMPLIANCE IN
THE CABLE INDUSTRY
The Department of Justice has claimed that using "existing processing
guidelines" to monitor EEO compliance in the cable industry is both uncon-
stitutional and beyond the scope of the agency's authority.2"' Although the
Department of Justice directed its comments at proposed cable industry
rules, its assertion suggests that applying processing guidelines to broadcast
industry data also may be invalid. Central to the Department of Justice's
current approach to employment discrimination litigation.2 is a belief that
nonvictims of discrimination are not entitled to preferential treatment.
2 23
The Department of Justice, however, supports affirmative action to provide
recruiting and training programs for interested qualified minorities designed
to draw more diverse applicants into a pool from which color-blind selec-
tions are made.224
Although the title VII standard is not identical to that applied by the
FCC, 2 25 the legislative history of title VII supports the Department of Jus-
219. See supra notes 182, 186, 213 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 165, 182, 186 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
222. Under the Reagan Administration, the Department of Justice has departed radically
from past civil rights enforcement efforts. For example, it no longer enters into consent de-
crees to ensure title VII compliance. In contrast, between 1972 and 1983, the Department of
Justice sued and obtained verdicts under title VII against 106 state and local government em-
ployers; of those, 93, or 88% were settled by consent decrees. Schwartzchild, Public Law By
Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Re-
form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 894 nn.41-42.
223. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ACTIVITIES: 1984-1985 19
("The Employment Litigation Section . . . does not use preferential selection requirements
that confer an undeserved benefit on nonvictims of discrimination. ... ), quoted in
Schwartzchild, supra note 222, at 896 n.53.
224. See Schwartzchild, supra note 222, at 896 n.53.
225. This difference in standards required by title VII and by the FCC's EEO programs is
best reflected by the analysis of employment data. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has found that in evaluating claims of employment discrimination
under title VII, "where specialized skills are legitimately required for employment, the proper
comparison is between the composition of the [employer's] workforce and the qualified popula-
tion." De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1982), quoting Davis v.
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tice's view that Congress never intended to allow such far-reaching intrusion
into the employment marketplace as practiced by the FCC.2 26 Clearly, Con-
gress has expressed concern about the possible use of remedial preferences to
the detriment of more qualified nonminority citizens.227 To alleviate con-
gressional concern that reverse discrimination may be fostered by title VII,
Congress passed an amendment that prohibited quotas by providing:
"Nothing contained in [title VII] shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or group on
Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (as amended Feb. 14, 1980); see also Valentino v.
United States Postal Service, 674 F.2d 56, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
However, the same court recently set forth several reasons why the FCC need not limit its
analysis of employment data to a comparison between worksite demographics and the number
of qualified workers available in an area. National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 775 F.2d
342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1985). First, the court found, title VII is antidiscrimination legislation,
while the FCC's EEO policy is an affirmative action program. Id. (citing 13 F.C.C.2d at 773-
75). Additionally, the FCC has expressly rejected petitions seeking reconsideration of its
guidelines to take into account only the "qualified" labor force. Id. (citing 79 F.C.C.2d at 928-
32, 60 F.C.C.2d at 232). The court, however, did note that the FCC has ample authority to
change its policies to create a different mechanism for evaluating employment statistics. Fur-
ther, the court noted, that since statistics, according to the Commission, are to be used only to
trigger closer review, the FCC is entitled to take the qualified/nonqualified distinction into
account in evaluating the "zone of reasonableness." Id. (citing EEO Processing Guidelines, 79
F.C.C.2d at 932).
226. As initially introduced in the House, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 included no com-
pulsory provision directed at private employment discrimination. Later, it was amended to
include title VII, which aimed to eliminate "discrimination in employment based on race,
color, religion, or national origin." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2401.
227. Opponents of title VII noted in a minority report that the word "discrimination"-
strangely-was absent from the bill and expressed fear that, if the measure passed, an em-
ployer "may be forced to hire according to race, to 'racially balance' those who work for him in
every job classification or be in violation of Federal law." H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 226,
at 69, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2438 (emphasis in original). After
passage by the House, the measure invoked protracted Senate debate. Opposition centered on
fears the House bill would impose a federally administered system of racial quotas. See, e.g.,
110 CONG. REC. 7778 (1968) ("Ultimately, I think the effect of the bill would be to compel an
employer in a given community to hire a given percentage of every nationality or ethnic back-
ground in the community.") (remarks of Sen. Tower). To allay those fears, the bill's floor
managers submitted an interpretative memorandum declaring that deliberate attempts by em-
ployers to maintain racial balance would violate title VII. That memorandum stated in part:
There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in
his workforce. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance,
whatever such a balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII because main-
taining such a balance would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the
basis of race. It must be emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any
individual.
Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152 Submitted Jointly by Senators Clark
and Case, Floor Managers, 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
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account of" a racial imbalance in the employer's work force.22 Thus, while
Congress specifically has authorized the use of affirmative action to en-
courage employers to hire and train minority workers in an effort to remedy
past discrimination, it has limited that broad grant by forbidding the use of
racial quotas.
The Department of Justice also finds support in Stotts for its objection to
hiring and promotion tools utilizing percentages, which it reads to support
the Administration's view that title VII prohibits remedial racial quotas and
authorizes relief only to actual victims of illegal discrimination. However,
since Stotts, several federal courts reviewing affirmative action cases have
disagreed.22 9 Although the scope of permissible affirmative action remedies
remains unclear,2 31 the Department of Justice appears to be correct in its
assessment that Stotts may preclude affirmative action programs like those
mandated by the FCC and enforced through sanctions imposed upon com-
panies failing to reach the parity levels provided for in the existing process-
ing guidelines.
However, the FCC steadfastly has insisted that those guidelines are
merely an administrative tool, not a quota system.231 In the past, it has
defended the constitutionality of the guidelines and now asserts that the va-
lidity of the cable EEO rules rests on the same firm foundation. The validity
of the guidelines, FCC attorneys assert, is supported by the fact that they
have been applied with the knowledge and tacit consent of federal courts
228. Civil Rights Act, tit. VII, § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982).
229. See Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268, 271-75 (1st Cir. 1985). In that case, a federal
district court took exception to the Justice Department's sweeping interpretation of Stotts in a
case brought by white police officers challenging the continuing validity of a consent decree
entered in a case alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race. In dismissing the
case, the court found that title VII law was not so substantially changed by Stotts as to invali-
date an existing consent decree which was designed to remedy alleged discriminatory practices
by establishing an annual minority hiring objective. See also EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d
1172, 1185-86 (2d Cir. 1985); Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 909-12 (3d Cir. 1984);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
2015 (1985).
230. The Supreme Court is expected to clarify its position on affirmative action when it
decides Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015
(1985). The Court granted certiorari in order to examine whether the Constitution allows use
of racial preferences in teacher layoffs conducted by a public employer. Arguments Before the
Court: Schools and Colleges, 54 U.S.L.W. 3339 (Nov. 19, 1985). In Wygant, there were no
findings of past discrimination and the preferences layoff formula stated that at no time would
a greater percentage of minority personnel be laid off than the percentage of minority employ-
ees at the time the collective bargaining agreement was struck between the teachers association
and the school board. 746 F.2d at 1154.
231. See, e.g., EEO Policies and Rules, 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 907 (1978); Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Processing Guidelines Modifications, 79 F.C.C.2d at 925.
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since 1972.232
The Commission reads Bakke to provide express authority for affirmative
action programs.2 33 In a 1978 analysis of the significance of that decision,
the General Counsel for the FCC noted the language in NAACP v. Federal
Power Commission suggesting that the Commission's broad EEO rules were
permissible under the Communications Act.234 The FCC's analysis also
stressed an important difference between the Davis admissions program and
the FCC's EEO rules: unlike the quota used in Bakke, the Commission's
rules do not require any licensee to establish fixed hiring quotas for minori-
ties. Instead, the General Counsel asserted, the statistical analysis employed
by the FCC is merely "an administrative tool to identify licensees whose
EEO programs may be deficient. '
The FCC's position is that the guidelines, as applied to broadcasters, pro-
vide a narrowly tailored solution to the well-known problem of discrimina-
tion in the broadcasting industry.2 36  The FCC's guidelines do not
automatically result in awarding employment to any candidate who is not
otherwise qualified. They simply suggest that the licensee should consider
race as a factor in arriving at employment decisions. Moreover, the guide-
lines do not ask that the licensee replicate the percentage of minority availa-
bility in the work force, only that he aim to achieve one-half of that level.
However, the additional data required by the cable EEO rules dramati-
cally increases the pressure on employers to base hiring and promotion deci-
sions primarily on race because they call for a far more detailed
categorization of hiring and promotion decisions by race and ethnicity.2 37
In addition to the paperwork burden the regulations impose, they also in-
crease the risk that employers will base hiring and promotion decisions
solely on race in an effort to please federal inspectors.
Under the three-part test that appears to have emerged from the Supreme
Court's most recent affirmative action cases,2 38 an analysis of the validity of
the FCC's employment regulations must begin by determining whether there
have been adequate congressional or administrative findings of industry dis-
crimination. The FCC has contended that agency involvement in the moni-
toring of employment practices stemmed from administrative findings that
232. See Bilingual, 492 F.2d 656 (1974); see also National Org. of Women v. FCC, 555
F.2d 1002, 1015-20 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
233. 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 907 (1978) (opinion of the FCC General Counsel that Bakke
casts no doubt on the validity of the Commission's equal opportunity policies and rules).
234. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
235. 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 909.
236. See supra notes 16-23, 29-30 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 218-20.
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the broadcast media had ignored certain minorities.239 Therefore, the FCC
contends there are no significant constitutional problems with its use of sta-
tistical analysis to compare labor force availability with the composition of a
broadcaster's or cable operator's work force.
Despite the FCC's assertion to the contrary, however, there have been no
FCC or congressional findings of illegal, industry-wide employment discrim-
ination in either the broadcast or cable industriesE--an obstacle that
proved fatal to the Commission's female preference system in Steele. 24 1 The
1968 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which the FCC General Counsel
claims provided the needed findings, addressed only unmet programming
and education needs, and then only indirectly by qtoting the Kerner Re-
port.242 Although the Jackson, Mississippi case provided an ample record
for finding a pattern of discrimination, it must be recalled that the Commis-
sion held that licensee was acting in the public interest.24
Even those scant administrative findings, however, are absent to justify
FCC involvement in the cable employment practices. The FCC based its
1972 decision to extend affirmative action requirements to cable companies
not on findings of discrimination but instead on the view that cable systems
operate much like broadcasters and should be subject to the same employ-
ment rules. 2 " Further, the legislative history of the Cable Act does not in-
clude findings of employment discrimination in the cable industry. Bakke
makes clear that evidence of past discrimination in society at large is insuffi-
cient to justify the imposition of an affirmative action program.24 5
Statistics suggest that the FCC's equal employment efforts have lessened
the problems of underrepresentation and underutilization of women and mi-
239. 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 909.
240. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In the Conference Report accompanying
the Communications Amendments Act of 1982, the conferees found that "the effects of past
inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination [that] have resulted in severe under-
representation of minorities in the media of mass communications," supported application of a
preference scheme to the lottery process. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2261, 2287. The legislative histories
of the Communications Amendments Act of 1982 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 375, both of which recommend adoption of a lottery
preference system, reveal that Congress never attributed minority and female underrepresenta-
tion to illegal discrimination by either governmental or private parties. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 897 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1010,
1259.
241. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 29-30 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
244. 34 F.C.C.2d at 190-91.
245. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
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norities in the broadcast industry.24 6 Similarly, EEO monitoring may have
encouraged employment of minorities and women in the cable industry.2 47
However, there is ample evidence to suggest Form 395 has encouraged em-
ployers to reclassify jobs, placing almost eighty percent of all broadcast
workers in the upper four categories, to achieve higher rankings, but has
done little to change the racial composition of the broadcast industry labor
force. 24 8 Deceptive classification of this sort will be worsened by cable EEO
rules requiring submission of detailed, categorical information on personnel
decisions.
Under the second prong of the Supreme Court's test for valid affirmative
action programs, it must be determined whether the FCC program is nar-
rowly tailored to remedy the effects of past discrimination without excluding
innocent groups or depriving individuals of vested rights. The FCC regula-
tions reflect an effort to meet this standard although they arguably go be-
yond the scope of the Act by suggesting that the "relevant labor pool" is the
SMSA. 2 4 9 Although the Act specifically states that the licensee is to "evalu-
ate its employment profile and job turnover against the availability of minor-
ities and women in its franchise area," 250 the Report and Order states that a
cable entity's employment data will be gauged against the availability of wo-
men and minorities in the SMSA, unless the company can show that would
be inappropriate.2 5 '
While the SMSA generally provides a convenient estimate of a broadcast
station's service area in many instances, it bears little resemblance to a cable
entity's franchise area. Additionally, the programming nexus that provides
the underpinning for FCC employment regulation cuts differently in cable
employment regulation, suggesting that local workers would be more in tune
with viewer programming needs than commuting workers. Also, cable sys-
tems are common in rural areas needing a wired system to provide reception
and in areas where turnover rates may be low and recruitment of highly
qualified women and minorities difficult.252 Comments filed by the National
Cable Television Association (NCTA) also provide good examples of the
246. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WINDOW DRESSING ON THE SET: AN UP-
DATE (1979).
247. See 50 Fed. Reg. 40,837 (1985).
248. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WINDOW DRESSING ON THE SET: AN UP-
DATE (1979). See also 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,844 n.32.
249. 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,843; see also supra notes 86, 118 and accompanying text.
250. Cable Act, § 634(d)(2), 47 U.S.C.A. § 554(c) (West Supp. 1985).
251. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
252. See 10 CABLEVISION 62 (Sept. 24, 1984) (most cable entities are located in small
municipalities or rural areas).
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problems inherent in using SMSA data to assess EEO compliance.2 53
NCTA cites as an example a cable operator that serves four unincorporated
communities in Northern Los Angeles County. The franchise area is located
within the Los Angeles-Long Beach, California SMSA, but is located two
commuting hours from Los Angeles, where minority concentration is high.
No public transportation runs between the city and the unincorporated ar-
eas. The NCTA noted that, according to the 1980 census data, 42.4% of
those living within the SMSA were minority members while only 8.8% of
the labor force in Northern Los Angeles County were minority members.
254
It also noted the vast geographic areas many SMSAs encompass, including
the Minneapolis-St. Paul SMSA, which spans 4,609 square miles and the
Atlanta SMSA, which covers 4,342 square miles. 25 5 The Report and Order
is a significant improvement over the notice proposal, however, because it
allows headquarters units of cable entities to distinguish between the "rele-
vant labor area" for entry level positions, for which there may be an ade-
quate number of local qualified applicants, and highly technical positions for
which firms could be expected to recruit nationally.
The third prong of the Supreme Court's affirmative action analysis re-
quires that valid programs be subject to continuing reassessment to assure
that they will cause the least possible harm to innocent third parties in the
short run and will not continue in duration beyond the point needed to re-
dress the effects of past discrimination. In this regard, the FCC fails to meet
the standard because its program is neither temporary nor does it assure that
EEO monitoring will do the least possible harm to innocent persons disad-
vantaged by it. Instead, the agency has responded to the success of broad-
casters in encouraging minority employment by raising the level of
employment of women and minorities that is expected. It then has applied
that heightened standard to the cable industry. Both the broadcast and
cable EEO regulations are different from affirmative action programs upheld
by federal courts in the past in that they do not provide for oversight and
they are of unlimited duration. The program challenged in Fullilove was of
limited duration. Therefore, there was no need for continuing oversight.2 56
Similarly, in United Steel Workers ofAmerica v. Weber,25 7 the Court upheld
an affirmative action plan after taking judicial notice of discrimination
253. See Comments of the National Cable Television Ass'n, FCC Docket 85-61 (filed June
19, 1985).
254. Id. at 19.
255. Id. at 19 n.37 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
1980 CENSUS).
256. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
257. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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against blacks in labor crafts, noting that "[t]he plan is a temporary measure;
it is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a mani-
fest racial imbalance. Preferential selection . . . will end as soon as the per-
centage of black skilled craft workers . . . approximates the percentage of
blacks in the local labor force."2 58 In the absence of an oversight mecha-
nism to limit duration of the EEO program, the cable regulations fail the
third prong of the Court's affirmative action test.
In addition to the failure of the cable employment regulations to meet the
requirements of a valid affirmative action program, it is unclear what real
impact they will have on the industry. As James C. McKinney, chief of the
FCC's Mass Media Bureau, has said, the result that a refusal to certify
would have on a cable entity remains uncertain."' "There is an expectation
that failure to receive certification will have an impact outside of the federal
arena," he said.2 6 The Commission assumes that knowledge of noncompli-
ance will be considered carefully by local franchising authorities, and that
noncompliance will have an impact on a cable operator's ability to sell its
system. Additionally, sanctions might be available, but would require a no-
tice and hearing procedure. If, following a hearing, a cable operator was
found substantially not in compliance with FCC rules, the Commission
might put the operator's license at risk and subject the entity to a $200-a-day
forfeiture. 261' However, McKinney said, there is not a direct connection be-
tween failure to receive a compliance certification and a federal penalty.2 62
The tenuous connection between FCC enforcement efforts and direct impact
on local entities probably means that those cable entities committed to fol-
lowing the spirit of federal antidiscrimination law will do so out of convic-
tion, not fear.
III. CONCLUSION
The equal employment opportunity regulations implemented by the FCC
are beyond the scope of the 1984 Cable Communications Act because they
impose a numerical standard on the evaluation of cable company hiring and
promotion efforts despite a legislative history that makes clear that this was
not the intent of Congress. Moreover, the regulations are not constitution-
ally sound under the three-part test that emerges from Bakke, Fullilove, and
Stotts. First, the regulations are flawed because they are not supported by
258. Id. at 198 n.1, 208-09.
259. Press conference with James C. McKinney, Chief, FCC Mass Media Bureau (Sept. 18,
1985).
260. Id.
261. See supra note 112, 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,853.
262. See McKinney, supra note 259.
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congressional or administrative findings of wide-spread discrimination
problems within the cable industry. Second, the FCC's EEO program is not
narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past discrimination without ex-
cluding innocent groups or depriving individuals of vested rights. The regu-
lations can be expected to result in reporting distortions by encouraging the
same sort of reclassifications of lower level workers that occur in the broad-
cast industry--clerical workers will be given inflated titles to satisfy federal
inspectors without corresponding increases in pay or responsibilities. It is
less clear whether the enforcement efforts of the Commission will force rural
and suburban cable systems to gauge parity levels by considering large mi-
nority populations in the nearest central city. Ironically, marginally em-
ployed white workers-those eligible for lower paying jobs that would be
filled by residents living near a station absent government interference-
probably will bear the brunt of the FCC's statistical inquiry. Lastly, the
regulations are flawed because they are not subject to continuing reassess-
ment to assure that they cause the least possible harm to innocent third par-
ties and to continue beyond the time needed to redress the effects of past
discrimination.
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